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STATUTORY VICARIOUS PARENTAL LIABILITY:
REVIEW AND. REFORM
The difficulties of holdingparentsliablefor the torts of their
minor children under the common law led to the passage of state
parentalresponsibility statutes. These statutes impose a limited
monetary liability on parentsfor the torts of their children. This
Note examines the rationale, evolution, andpurpose ofparental
responsibilitystatutes. The authoralso discusses the varyingjudicialoutlooks on the variousstatutes. In an effort to obviate interpretative difficulties, the Note concludes by presenting a Model
ParentalResponsibility act, which will provide for a fairer and
more coherent system.
INTRODUCTION

The dominant goal pervading the entire body of tort law is
compensation of the innocent victim.' When the tortfeasor is an
impecunious minor child, and the injured victim sues the child's
parents, four basic common law recovery theories are available:

agency, ratification, parental negligence, and knowledge of tortious activity. 2 Each, however, presents unique obstacles to the

achievement of the compensatory aim. A plaintiff using an
agency theory,3 for example, must establish the existence of an
agency relationship-a difficult task in the parent-child setting.
The imposition of parental liability via the parent's post-act ratification4 of the child's act can be justified only where the parent's
pre-act subjective view is that vicarious liability exists, or where a
1. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (4th ed. 1971).
2. Under the common law parents cannot be held liable for their minor child's torts
solely on the basis of the parent-child relationship. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Faulkner,
259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Richardelle, 528 S.W.2d 280 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975). This Note limits its analysis to common law jurisdictions. In civil law
jurisdictions liability can be based solely on the parent-child relationship. Deshotel v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 231 So. 2d 448 (La. Ct. App. 1970), aft'd, 257 La. 567, 243 So. 2d 259
(1971). For a general discussion of the four common law bases for parental liability:
agency, ratification, parental negligence, and knowledge of tortious tendencies, see Kent,
ParentalLiabilityforthe Torts of Children, 50 CONN. B.J. 452, 455-64 (1976).
3. See, e.g., Trahan v. Smith, 239 S.W. 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (defendant's son
attacked and killed plaintifi's cow with a dog so as to impose liaility on defendant based on
agency).
4. See, e.g., Howell v. Norton, 134 Miss. 616, 99 So. 440 (1924) (defendant liable
where evidence showed he ratified his son's shooting of plaintifis dog).
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master-servant relationship actually exists.5 In a simple negli-

gence action against the parents,6 the plaintiff's task is hindered by
the general rule that a parental duty to control a child's behavior
does not arise unless the parent knows or is recklessly unaware of

the child's propensity to commit tortious acts.7 Finally, an action
may arise where the parent entrusts the child with a dangerous

instrumentality.8 The intrinsic difficulties with this approach include the finding that many instrumentalities are not, per se, dangerous. 9 Furthermore, even where a dangerous instrumentality is
involved, a strict showing of the child's incompetence is often
required. °

The problems inherent in establishing common law liability
against parents of minor tortfeasors led to the passage of many
state parental responsibility tort statutes.'1 This Note examines

the imposition of vicarious liability on parents through these parental responsibility statutes by exploring the economic rationales
supporting such statutes.' 2 Concluding that parental responsibil-

ity tort statutes generally are supported by the theories of least
cost prevention and shock reduction loss spreading,' 3 the Note
then analyzes the evolution and nature of parental responsibility
5. See Jones v. Mutual Creamery Co., 81 Utah 223, 230, 17 P.2d 256, 259 (1932).
Ratification based on the mere acceptance of benefits by the parent, which in the parentchild tort context presumably consists of the parent's pleasure in seeing the tort victim
suffer, is often not sufficient to impose liability. See, e.g., id. at 233, 17 P.2d at 260.
6. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App. 2d 231, 604 P.2d 79 (1979) (complaint
alleging plaintiffs child was beaten by defendant's child states valid claim, since parents
may be held liable for tortious acts caused by their own negligence in failing to exercise
reasonable care to control their child). As with any negligence claim, the usual four elements of the cause of action-duty, breach of the duty, proximate cause, and injury-must
be estabished. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 143-44.
7. See Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 592, 183 N.E.2d 706, 707 (1962) (father who
knew of son's tendency to assault and molest young children liable for son's tortious
actions).
8. See, e.g., Jarboe v. Edwards, 26 Conn. Supp. 350, 223 A.2d 402 (Super. Ct. 1966)
(jury allowed to determine whether matches constitute a dangerous instrumentality). The
inherently dangerous instrumentality doctrine, of course, has no application in cases where
the child commited the tort solely through the use of bodily force.
9. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Droppers, 184 Wis. 400, 198 N.W. 738 (1924) (automobile
held not to be inherently dangerous per se). In cases where noninherently dangerous instrumentalities are involved, courts must conduct a balancing analysis, Kent, supra note 2,
at 461, which further decreases the predictability of the outcome of plaintiffs action.
10. See Comment, Liabilityof Negligent Parentsforthe Torts of Their Minor Children,
19 ALA. L. REV. 123, 127 (1966).
11. Kent, supra note 2, at 465.
12. See infra notes 18-37 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.

1982]

STATUTORY VICARIOUS PARENTAL LIABILITY

statutes. 14 An investigation of the purposes underlying the statutes and judicial interpretations of various statutory requirements
is then presented,' 5 followed by an examination of insurance relief
available under the acts. 6 The Note concludes with the presentation and analysis of a Model Parental Responsibility Act'7 offered
in an attempt to improve current statutes.
I.

ECONOMIC RATIONALES FOR PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

STATUTES

Vicarious liaility is justified by several economic rationales. 18
Two of these rationales are particularly relevant to the imposition
of vicarious liability through parental responsibility tort statutes:
least cost prevention and shock reduction loss spreading.
A. Least Cost Prevention

The typical vicarious liabilty scenario consists of three actors:
the master, the servant, and the injured third party. The aim of

least cost prevention is to determine on which party to impose liability so as to minimize overall costs. 19 That party, termed the
"least cost preventor," is usually the master.2 0 In the typical enter-

prise setting, the master usually knows more about the business
and its attendant risks than do either the servant or the third

party. As among all three parties, therefore, the master usually
can best take precautionary measures against the servant's tortious
activities. Similarly, as between the parent, child, and injured

third party, the parent usually can best take precautions against
the child's tortious behavior. 2 ' The parent's superior knowledge
of the child and the child's propensitites justifies imposition of liability on the parent, just as the master's superior knowledge justi14. See infra notes 40-93 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 94-177 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 172-206 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
18. See Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1977); Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 956, 959-600, 471 P.2d 988, 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. 188, 190 (1970);
Strait v. Hale Constr. Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 941, 948-49, 103 Cal. Rptr. 487, 492-93 (1972);
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499
(1961); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 592-94
(1929); James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REv. 161, 163 (1954).
19. James, supra note 18, at 163.
20. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 459; James, supra note 18, at 163; Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433, 448 (R. Pound ed.
1934).
21. See Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1211 (3d Cir. 1977).
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fies imposition of liability in the enterprise setting. Furthermore,
children are often too immature to realize the consequences of
their actions. Failing to perceive a risk in their activity, children
are not apt to take substantial precautionary actions. 2 Innocent
victims who may never have had previous contact with the child
are also in a poor position to plan for the child's potential tortious
acts, because they are ignorant of the child's propensities.
Least cost prevention theory also "prods" the least cost
preventor into taking preventive action. 23 The imposition of statutory vicarious liability is justified similarly as an inducement to
parents to modify their own behavior by exercising more control
over their children. To provide an effective prod to stimulate the
desired behavior, the least cost prevention rationale assumes the
master can exercise a right of control over the servant.2 4 Without
an exercisable right of control, precautionary measures will not be
encouraged because absent such a right, the master cannot be certain that precautionary measures will not be vitiated by the servant's deviations from the assigned duties.
The assumption of an exercisable right of control presents the
strongest challenge to the efficacy of the least cost prevention rationale in the parent-child context. The goal of the rationale is to
determine which party is the least cost preventor.2 5 The parent
certainly has a stronger right of control over the child than does
the tort victim. Considering the child's immaturity and failure to
perceive risk in tortious activity, the least cost preventor in the
transaction is the parent. Because vicarious parental liability
prods parents into taking precautionary actions to control their
child's behavior, parental responsibility statutes are justified by
the basic economic rationale of least cost prevention.
B.

26

Shock Reduction Loss Spreading

The objective of the shock reduction loss spreading rationale is
22. See Calabresi, supra note 18, at 543.
23. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.5 (1956); see W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, at 459.
24. See Douglas, supra note 18, at 588.

25. James, supra note 18, at 163.
26. The term "shock reduction loss spreading" may have originated in the now classic
article by Professor Young B. Smith, Frolicand Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV.444 (1923), in
which Smith implied that "the justification for imposing liability upon the master is the
desire to spread and distribute 'the shock of the accident .... "' Id. at 460. Another
commentator has described the shock reduction loss spreading rationale for respondeat
superior liability as "focus[ing] on the ability of principals, especially in a commercial
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compassion. 2' The loss resulting from tort liability does not fall
solely on one of the three parties, but is distributed among individuals who were not involved in the tortious incident. 28 In the
business setting, the master can spread the loss by allocating it
between multiple owners, obtaining insurance, increasing the
price of its product,2 9 or obtaining lower factor input costs. 30 The
reasoning is that the servant cannot perform these loss spreading
functions-or at least not as well as can the master. 3 1 Liability is
on the master as the instigator of the loss producing
thus imposed
32
activity.

Although tort liability may be imposed on a minor child,33
shock reduction loss spreading reallocates the loss resulting from a
child's tort from the victim to the child's parents, often spreading
the costs between two parents instead of imposing costs on one

child.34 Furthermore, while parents can obtain insurance35

against their minor child's torts, children usually can neither understand, nor procure insurance.3 6 While loss spreading could be
achieved by holding the child responsible, it will be performed

more efficiently by imposing parental responsibility. The tort victim benefits, in particular, from the shock reduction loss spreading
justification for parental responsibility statutes; since the childtortfeasor will usually be impecunious, the loss spreading accomplished by parental responsibility statutes increases the likelihood

of adequate compensation for the victim.
Parental responsibility statutes, justified by the rationale of
setting, to distribute the risk of loss arising out of the torts of their agents by either
or by obtaining insurance."
increasing the sale price of the goods or services that they sell,
Wyse, A Framework of Analysisfor the Law ofAgency, 40 MONT.L. REv. 30, 37 (1979).
27. See Calabresi, supra note 18, at 588.
28. See infra notes 29 & 37 and accompanying text.
29. Loss spreading via increased product prices is termed "secondary" loss spreading.
Calabresi, supra note 18, at 518-19.
30. Id. at 543-44.
31. Id. at 543.
32. The instigation of the activity is crucial for it furnishes the awareness that shock
reduction loss spreading should begin. Instigation provides: 1) awareness that the conduct
has begun; 2) awareness of the risks involved, and 3) awareness of the sort of losses that
might be occasioned.
33. See W. PROSSER,supra note 1, at 996-1000.
34. See Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1209-10 (3d Cir. 1977).
35. Simple homeowner's policies often provide protection. See infra notes 172-85 and
accompanying text. But see infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text (homeowner's policy
held not to provide coverage for statutorily imposed parental liability). 36. Cf. Calabresi,supra note 18, at 543 (master better able to perceive risks and obtain
insurance at lower rates).
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shock reduction loss spreading, prevent the imposition of undue
economic burdens on any individual party by distributing the
losses resulting from the child's tort. The statutes find further support in the least cost prevention doctrine. 37 This justification of

parental liability by basic economic rationales for vicarious liability is a factor that pervades the entire discussion of parental responsibility statutes.3 8
37. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
38. The respondeat superior rationales are rigorously tested when the master is held
liable for the servant's knowingly harmful behavior. This inquiry is particularly relevant to
the discussion of parental responsibility tort statutes, for these statutes typically hold parents liable for only the "willful" or "malicious" torts of their children. See infra notes
46-51 and accompanying text.
Under traditional respondeat superior analysis, a master is generally liable only for the
torts of servants committed within the scope of their employment. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957). Knowingly harmful behavior is traditionally excluded
from the scope of employment as conduct which is "too little actuated by a purpose to serve
the master." Id. § 228(2). Courts applying this reasoning were reluctant to hold the master
liable because of a lack of assent to the knowingly harmful acts. Comment, Respondeat
Superior-IntentionalTorts as Being Within the Scope of Employment, 40 MARQ. L. REv.
337, 338 (1956). Under this standard, a master would not be held liable for a servant's
knowingly harmful behavior.
The modem trend seems to include the servant's knowingly harmful behavior within
the scope of employment in certain instances and, hence to broaden the category of acts for
which a master may be held vicariously liable. See Brill, The Liability ofAn Employer For
the Wilful Torts ofHis Servants, 45 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1, 4 (1968). Illustrative of this trend
are two cases from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Nelson v. AmericanWest African Line, Inc., 86 F.2d 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 665 (1936), Judge
Learned Hand made a pioneering attempt to bring knowingly harmful behavior within the
scope of employment by applying a mixture-of-motives test. Judge Hand held that the
alcohol induced act of a ship's boatswain in awakening a plaintiff-sailor by a crack over the
head with a wooden bench and a cry to "turn to," although knowingly harmful, may have
been within the scope of employment if the behavior was coupled with the boatswainservant's intent to serve the defendant-master. Id. at 732. In another drunken sailor case,
Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968), Judge Henry
Friendly rejected Hand's mixture-of-motives test, id. at 171, and substituted the standard
that a servant's knowingly harmful behavior may be imputed to the master if its risks are
characteristically attendant upon the operation of the master's business through the servant. Id. The plaintiff in Bushey thus recovered for damage to its drydock caused by an
intoxicated Coast Guard seaman's opening of a floodgate. Id. at 173.
The inclusion of knowingly harmful behavior challenges, but does not overwhelm, the
ability of the rationales to justify respondeat superior liability in the parent-child framework. In terms of least cost prevention, while parents may not be able to pinpoint the exact
type of knowingly harmful behavior in which their children will engage, they probably can
be fairly certain that such activity inevitably will occur despite their best efforts to the
contrary; precautionary actions may still be taken. For an extended discussion on why
least cost prevention may actually be more justifiable by including liability for intentional
activity, which may or may not be knowingly harmful-as opposed to negligent behavior-see infra text accompanying note 49. Similarly, while pretort shock reduction loss
spreading may be more difficult for parents to engage in, the fact that the child's tortious
behavior was knowingly harmful will not affect the ability of the parents to fractionalize
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II.

THE

EVOLUTION AND NATURE OF PARENTAL

RESPONSIBILITY STATUTES

The inherent difficulties with the four common law bases for

parental liability39 led to the passage of state parental responsibility statutes. 40 Every state except New Hampshire has enacted
such legislation. 41 Although most states adopted parental responthe accompanying losses via traditional loss spreading techniques. See generally text accompanying supra notes 34-36 (general loss spreading techniques). Furthermore, as one
commentator notes:
[t]he trend ... toward expansion of the "scope of employment".., validly reflects the underlying justification for respondeat superior--that the employer
[master] is the one best able to absorb the injured person's losses as a risk of doing
business and to pass them on to society as a whole.
Brill, supra, at 34. Even with the inclusion of knowingly harmful behavior within the liability producing scope of employment of the servant, respondeat superior liability in general, and statutory vicarious parental liability in particular, are justified by the basic
economic rationales of least cost prevention and shock reduction loss spreading.
39. See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text.
40. Kent, supra note 2, at 465.
41. The 49 state parental respnsibility statute are:
PERSONAL
DATE OF
STATUTE

ENACTMENT

1965
ALA. CODE § 6-5-380 (1975) ..................
1957
ALASKA STAT. § 34.50.020 (1975) ..............
1956
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-661 (1982) ........
1959
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-109 (Supp. 1979) ........
1955
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West Supp.1980) ......
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-107 (Supp. 1978) 1959
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (West Supp.
1955
1981) .....................................
1958
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3922 (Supp. 1980) ....
1967
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.24 (West Supp. 1982) ....
1956
GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1 13 (Supp. 1981) ........
1858
HAWAn REV. STAT. § 577-3 (1976) .............
1957
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-210 (1979) ..............
Parental Responsibility Law,
51-57 (Smith-Hurd
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70
1969
Supp. 1981) ...............................
1957
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-31-1 (Bums Supp. 1980)
1969
IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.16 (West Supp. 1981) ...
1959
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-120 (Supp. 1979) ........
1968
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.025 (Baldwin 1979)..
1804
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1979) ......
1959
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 217 (1981) .......
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829
1959
(Supp. 1981) ..............................
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85G (West
Supp. 1981) ............................... .1969
1953
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2913 (Supp. 1981)
1967
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 540.18 (West Supp. 1982) ..
1978
MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-2 (Supp. 1981) .......
1965
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.045 (Vernon Supp. 1981) .
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-237 to 40-6-238
1957
(1981) ....................................

RECOVERY
LIMIT

$

INJURY
COVERED

500
2000
2500
2000
5000
1500

No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

3000
5000
2500
500
No limit
1500

Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No

1000
750
1000
1000
2500
No limit
800

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

5000

Yes

1000
2500
500
2000
2000

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

2500

No
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sibility statutes within the last three decades,4 2 Hawaii 43 and Loui45
siana 4 have had such statutes for over 100 years.
A.

Basic Statutory Elements

1. Liability LimitationforIntentionalTorts

Most parental responsibility statutes impose liability only for a
child's intentional torts. 46 The typical staututory language emNEB. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (1978) ..............
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.470 (1979) ...............
N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:53A-14 to -17 (West Supp.
1981) .....................................
N.M. STXT. ANN. § 32-1-46 (1981) .............
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-112 (McKinney Supp.
1981) .....................................
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (1969) ..............
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (1976) ...........
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.09, 3109.10 (Page
1980) .....................................
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10

1951
1957

1000*
10,000

Yes
Yes

1965
1957

No limit
2500

No
No

1970
1961
1957

1500
500
1000

No
No
No

1967

3000**
2000***

Yes

1957
1959

1500
5000

Yes
Yes

1967

300****
1000*****
1500
1000

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

(West Supp.

1981) .....................................
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.765 (1979) ................
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2001-2005 (Purdon
Supp. 1981) ..............................

R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-3 (Supp. 1981) .....
1956
S.C. CODE § 20-7-340 (Supp. 1982) ............
1965
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-5-15 (Supp.
1981) .....................................
1957
750
Yes
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1001 to -1003 (Supp.
1981) .....................................
1957
10,000
No
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 33.01-.03 (Vernon
Supp. 1981) ...............................
1957
15,000
No
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-20 (1977) ...........
1977
1000
No
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 901 (1974) ............
1959
250
Yes
VA. CODE §§ 8.01-43 to -44 (1977) .............
1960
200
No
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.190 (Supp. 1981).
1961
3000
No
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7A-2 (Supp. 1981) .....
1957
2500
Yes
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.035 (West Supp. 1981) ...
1957
1000
Yes
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-203 (1978) ...........
1965
300
No
* Recovery only limited for personal injury.
** Property damage recovery limit.
Personal injury recovery limit.
Recovery limit in single-plaintiff cases.
Recovery limit in multiple-plaintiff cases.
42. Note, The Iowa ParentalResponsibilityAct,55 Iowa L. REV. 1037, 1037 n.3 (1970).
43. HAwAii REV. STAT. § 577-3 (1976).
44. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1979).
45. See supra note 42.
46. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3922 (Supp. 1980) (intentional or reckless torts);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 577-3 (1976) ("tortious acts"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613-16 (West
Supp. 1981) ("unlawful acts"); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1979) ("damage" infficted by minor); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829 (Supp. 1981) ("delinquent
act"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (West Supp. 1981) ("criminal or delinquent act");
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ployed holds parents liable for their child's "malicious" and/or
"willful" tortious acts.47 That limitation is supported by the least
cost prevention rationale for vicarious liability.
Arguably, least cost preventing parents modify their behavior
to guard against only those tortious acts of their children that are
reasonably foreseeable-intentional acts. Negligent acts are less
predictable than intentional acts and thus the justifications underlying the least cost prevention theory are not so pertinent.48 The
more negligent and unpredictable the child's behavior, the less effective the parents' rights of control and ability to take precautionary measures. Furthermore, since negligent behavior is by
definition unpredictable, imposing vicarious parental liability for
such acts would create an onerous burden a parent could not reasonably be expected to discharge. In a least cost prevention
framework, limiting the parents' statutorily imposed responsibility
to the child's intentional torts confines the liability producing behavior of the child within the parents' exercisable right of control.
This constraint prods parents into taking adequate precautionary
measures while limiting liability to those areas where third parties
can reasonably expect the effective exercise of parental control.
Limiting liability to intentional torts is less easily justified
under the shock reduction loss spreading theory. The compassionate aim of that theory would favor parental liability for the
child's negligent torts, as well. The prime loss spreaders in the
transaction-the parents-can remove the costs of the tortious
negligence from any one of the individual actors by engaging in
loss spreading. A child's negligent acts, however, seem to engender more compassion for the child than would the child's intentional acts. (This observation is tempered, perhaps, by the
frequent inability of children to perceive the risks of even their
intentional acts.) In addition, limiting liability to intentional torts
does not aid the parent's ability to spread the loss through insurance. Most standard homeowners' insurance policies will cover
the parent for any liability incurred without differentiating beTEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 33.01 (Vernon Supp. 1981) (parents also liable for minor's

negligent torts if attributable to negligent parental control).
47. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-120 (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-46 (1981);
W. VA. CODE § 55-7A-2 (Supp. 1981).
48. The parent-child context illustrates this fact by imposing a duty on parents to

control their minor child if they are aware of the child'spropensityto commit tortious acts.
See, e.g., Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962).
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tween liability for the child's negligent or intentional acts.4 9
Therefore, the shock reduction loss spreading rationale does not

fully support the limitation of parental liability to the child's intentional torts.
The limitation of liability to intentional torts recognizes that

parents cannot fully control their child's actions.5 0 Least cost prevention analysis supports the limitation. Shock reduction loss
spreading, though, does not fully justify the intentional torts limitation. That limitation is a valid concession to the fact that parents may also be found liable under the common law for their

child's negligent acts. 1
2. Types of Intentional Tortious Activity Embraced

All parental reponsibility statutes hold parents liable for property damage intentionally caused by their children; many also im-

pose liability for personal injury inflicted by the child.5 2 Again,

the basic economic rationales justify these provisions. The stat-

utes' inclusion of liability for only relatively common torts like
property damage or personal injury greatly facilitates least cost
prevention by parents. 3 Parents can take precautions more easily
for such tortious activity than for more unusual torts like defamation or misrepresentation. Shock reduction loss spreading also

supports the limitation of liability to fairly common torts. The.
primary vehicle by which parents spread costs is insurance.54
Property damage and personal injury are common types of child-

inflicted torts, and so parental liability insurance coverage for
such acts presumably would be easy to procure. Thus, further
49. See generallyinfra notes 161-73 and accompanying text (rights of insured parents
discussed).
50. Cf. Kent, supra note 2, at 453 (limits on amount of recovery recognize parental
inability to fully control their minor children).
51. One commonly used method for holding a parent liable for the minor child's negligence is the "family purpose docrine." Comment, ParentalLiabilityfora Child's Tortious
Acts, 81 DICK. L. REv. 755, 760 (1977). The child's negligence is imputed to the parent,
who has made an automobile available for family use. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 48384; see also Finnocchio v. Lunsford, 129 Ga. App. 694, 201 S.E.2d 1 (1973) (parent held
liable under family purpose doctrine).
52. Twenty-three statutes allow recovery for property damage only; 26 permit actions
for both property damage and personal injury. But see HAWAI REV. STAT. § 577-3 (1976)
("tortious acts"); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1979) ("damage occasioned by" the
minor); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.765 (1979) ("any tort intentionally committed").
53. An interesting issue is whether the term "personal injury" in parental responsibility statutes encompasses emotional, as well as physical injury. No court has found a parent
liable under a parental resonsibility statute for a child's infliction of emotional injury.
54. See infra notes 172-206 and accompanying text.
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limiting imposition of statutory parental liability to property
damage and personal injury inflicted by the child is consistent
with the general economic rationales underlying parental responsibility statutes.
3.

The Limitation on Recoverable Damages

Many states also limit the amount of damages recoverable
under parental responsibility statutes.55 The average recovery
limit is approximately $2500.56 Limiting the amount of recoverable damages, however, does not serve the statutes compensatory
aim.57 In many cases the amounts of recoverable damages will
not adequately compensate the victim. Furthermore, by limiting
the amount of recoverable damages, parental responsibility statutes can be viewed as a fine or penalty on parents disguised as a
compensatory measure.5 8
a. Judicial Interpretations of Recovery Limits. Litigation
under the various parental responsibility statutes forces courts to

construe the statutes' wording. Creative judicial interpretation
has produced some interesting determinations of the various par-

ties' rights and duties regarding the damage limits. For instance,
typical statutes limit the recovery from "parents" to a certain dollar amount.5 9 In construing the word "parents," courts have held

that a plaintiff may not collect damages up to the statutory limit
from each parent and, in effect, win a double judgment.6 0 This

interpretation accords with the general vicarious liability rationales supporting parental responsibility statutes. The least cost
55. Note, supra note 42, at 1041. But see HAwAII REv. STAT. § 577-3 (1976) (unlimited
damages allowed); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1979) (unlimited damages allowed); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-801 (1978) (only damage limit placed on personal injury; no
limit on damages for destruction of property); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-15 (West Supp.
1981) (unlimited damages allowed).
56. The $2500 average recovery limit was calculated from the damage limits previously noted in supra note 41.
57. See General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 323, 130 S.E.2d 645, 650
(1963). For a general discussion of the purpose behind parental responsibility statutes, see
infra notes 94-127 and accompanying text.
58. See Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 749, 182 S.E.2d 766, 769 (1971).
59. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-109 (Supp. 1979) FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.24 (West
Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (1969).
60. See, eg., Windish v. Watts, 9 Pa. D. & C.3d 234, 235 (C.P. Bucks County 1979).
The court noted that part of the Pennsylvania statute defines the term "parent" as "includ[ing] natural or adoptive parents." Id. at 235. The liability section's use of "parents,"
however, was held to preclude any finding other than that only one judgment was allowed.
Id. "If the legislators wish to impose a liability ... on each parent they could have easily
so stated... but did not do so." Id.
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preventor is, technically speaking, the "parental-unit," consisting
of both mother and father together. Recovery is properly limited
to damages from that least cost preventor-the parental unit. Denying a recovery from each parent separately does not blunt the
statutes' shock reduction loss spreading impact; liability and the
loss are still shifted away from the child and the victim.6 '
Another interesting result of this recovery limit interpretation
is the effect on episodic tortious behavior by the child. In Buie v.
Longspaugh.62 the defendant's minor daughter and a friend en-

tered three houses, each owned by a separate plaintiff.63 The girls
plugged various drains in the houses and turned on the water.
The water overflowed, resulting in extensive damage in each
house.64 The three plaintiffs sued under the Texas parental responsibility statute.65 Each plaintiff recovered the statutory limit
of $5,000 ($2,500 per defendant), for a total judgment of $15,000.66
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Texas statute limited parental liability to
$5,000per tortious act, not $5,000 for a series of tortious acts in a
single episode.6 7 The court found that allowing the maximum re-

covery for each tortious act on a single occasion affords property
owners the greatest amount of protection. 68 The court also implicitly recognized the least cost prevention ramifications of its holding, observing that the allowance for recovery for each act "will
provide.

. .

encouragement for parents to train, control, and dis-

cipline their children. ' 69 Thus, permitting such a recovery will
61. Indeed, such a de facto reduction of damages, from twice what they might have
been, may actually enhance the loss spreading effect. The lower the damage amount, the
easier it will be for the parents to spread. The relatively low recovery limits may, however,
retard the parents' incentive to engage in loss spreading.
62. 598 S.W.2d 673 (rex. Civ. App. 1980).
63. Id. at 674.
64. Id.
65. Id. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2,§§ 33.01-.03 (Vernon Supp. 1981).
66. 598 S.W.2d at 674.

67. Id. Appellant-parents argued that since the purpose of the Texas parental responsibility statute was penal in nature, the required strict construction of its provisions limited
parental liability to $5,000perepisode of tortious acts. Id. at 675. At least one other court
has partially accepted this argument regarding another state's parental responsibility statute. See infra note 121 and accompanying text. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, however, rejected this alleged penal purpose: "Upon careful consideration we conclude that

the purpose of these provisions is to protect and compensate property owners from the
wilful and malicious destruction of their property by minors." 598 S.W.2d at 675.
68. Id. at 676.

69. Id.
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emphasize the role of the least cost preventor in taking precautionary measures.
The Buie interpretation is clearly correct. Parental responsibility statutes allow recovery for the infliction of damage. In Buie,
three separate plaintiffs suffered three isolated occurrences of
damage. Had there been only one plaintiff and one damaged
house the maximum allowable recovery for that plaintiff would
have been $5,000. If the defendants had committed three separate
drain-plugging acts in one plaintiff's house, each resulting in water
damage, allowing recovery of the statutory limit for each act becomes more questionable. Although the acts may be separable,
the damage may not be apportionable.7 ° The separate acts in one
house produce, in effect, one "quantum" of damage.
Finally, limiting of damages under a parental responsibility
statute generally does not preclude a concurrent common law action for damages. In Boardof County Commissioners v. Harkey,7
the defendant's minor son destroyed an $18,000 tractor owned by
the county, using blasting caps the defendant had stored negligently.72 The county commissioners alleged two causes of action
against the defendant,7 3 negligence and statutory vicarious liability. 74
Finding the county sought a single remedy75
the court held no election of remedies was required.7 6
damages
Furthermore, since the requisite burden of proof and relief sought
in the two causes were not repugnant to each other, the common
law and statutory claims were held to be joinable in a single action.77 Adequate compensation of the tort victim mandates such
concurrent use of common law and statutory remedies. Parental
responsibility statutes were enacted originally to fill the gaps and
cure the procedural and evidentiary deficiencies which existed in
70. The general problem suggested is the matching of effects with causes. For a discussion of this problem, see Scott, The Apportionment of'2"ndivisible"Inftries,61 MARQ. L.
REv. 559 (1978). The parental responsibility statutes were designed to hold parents liable
for their children's torts; they cannot be expected to solve the apportionment problem,
which pervades the entire field of torts.
71. 601 P.2d 125 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979).
72. Id. at 126.

73. Id. at 126-27. The Oklahoma parental responsibility statute, typical of such statutes, provides "ft]he state or any county, city, town, municipal corporation or school dis-

trict, or any person, corporation or organization" with specific standing to sue. OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (West Supp. 1981).
74.
75.
76.
77.

601 P.2d at 126-27.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 127.
Id.
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the various common law remedies.7 8 As interstitial relief, the statutes should not preclude the use of common law theories, but
rather should be available if the common law relief is
inapplicable.
Buie demonstrates how the damage limits in parental responsibility statutes are interpreted to mold the relief portions of the
statutes to the avowed statutory purpose. As Harkey further illustrates, liberal judicial interpretation of the damage limits provides
a great deal of flexibility in granting relief.
b. Advantages andDisadvantagesofReco very Limits. Limiting
the amount of damages recoverable under a parental responsibility statute has several benefits. Without a damage limit, parents of
a minor tortfeasor could incur huge debts to the victim's insurance
company. 79 As a result, insurance would be harder to obtain, and
premiums would almost certainly increase. Another beneficial aspect of statutory damage limits is adjustability.8 0 Limits on recovery can be increased by amendment to keep up with inflation.
Placing an absolute limit on the amount a tort victim can recover, however, also has serious disadvantages. The most obvious
drawback is that the victim is often not adequately compensated.81
As the difference between the victim's actual damages and the
statutory limit increases, the discriminatory effect becomes more
pronounced since a smaller percentage of total damages will actually be recovered. A sliding scale measure, providing the same
percentage recovery to all victims, would further the compensatory goal of the statute and remedy this deficiency.
Another limiting factor of damage ceilings is the inhibitory effect on litigation. Artificially depressed statutory recovery limits
may discourage attorneys from representing a plaintiff on a contingency fee basis. This effectively prevents a large class of potential litigants, unable to afford an initial retainer, from obtaining
counsel to pursue their claims. Furthermore, without a statutory
78. See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
79. See Nevada Committee on Judiciary, Minutes of Meeting, April 6, 1979, at 6 (remarks of Assemblyman Garrod). Most tort victims will seek compensation from their own
insurance companies. After discharging the victim-insured's claim, the insurer will be subrogated to its insured's cause of action. In this capacity the insurer may seek reimbursement
from the tortfeasor.
80. Cf. Letter from Sylvia M. Alberdi to Michael Axel (October 1, 1981) (indicating
that comments at committee hearing, where damage limit of FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.24
(West Supp. 1982) was increased from $1,000 to $2,500, imply that the increase was
designed to keep pace with inflation).
81. See Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 749, 182 S.E.2d 766, 769 (1971).
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provision allowing recovery of attorneys' fees, the damage amount
may be insufficient to satisfy the needs of both the tort victim and
the attorney.
c. Conclusions. By limiting parental liability to a set dollar
amount, parental responsibility statutes do not further the general
vicarious liability rationales.82 In a least cost prevention analysis,
low recovery limits may be inadequate to induce preventative behavior by parents. With limits as low as $1,000 or $2,000, parents
may tend to forego precautionary action and risk a judgment
against them. Moreover, by establishing a set dollar figure on
damages, parental responsibility statutes allow parents to calculate with certainty the economic cost of precautionary forbearance. If this economic cost is sufficiently low, parents will not be
induced to take precautionary action. If the parent elects not to
take precautionary measures, it is the tort victim who will suffer
injury or damage that could have been avoided.
Shock reduction loss spreading is equally unfulfilled. The
overall objective-compassion 83 -is not advanced by placing a
limit on parental liability. As the amount of damages imposed on
the parents increases, loss spreading will increase correspondingly.
Thus, as parental liability is expanded, the compassionate aim of
the rationale is enhanced by preventing more of the damage from
falling on any one of the three actors.
Most parental responsibility statutes thus possess certain similar features. Liability is often limited to the child's intentional
torts.84 Most of the statutes, furthermore, pertain only to relatively
common torts like property damage and personal injury. 5 Finally, recovery is often limited to a specific maximum dollar
82. New Jersey sought to remedy this problem by totally abolishing the damage limit
in its parental responsibility statue, N.J. RE,. STAT. §§ 2A:53A-14 to -17 (West Supp.
1981). The New Jersey experience illustrates the typical "number juggling" that often ac-

companies changes in the damage limit.
The parental responsibility statute originally contained a recovery limit of $250. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-15 (West Supp. 1981). The original amendment, S.B. No. 650, would
have increased the limit to $1,000. STATE OF NEw JERSEY, STATEMENT ON S.B. No. 650
(1978). As presented to the governor, the recovery limit would have been set at $2,000.
NEW JERSEY ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY, LAW, PUBLIC SAFETY AND DEFENSE COMMITTEE,
STATEMENT TO SENATE, No. 640 (1979). Governor Byrne, apparently striving to make the

statute more compensatory in nature, recommended the elimination of the recovery limit
altogether. B. BYRNE, VETO MESSAGE TO S.B. No. 650 (1979). Following the governor's
lead, the legislature abolished the damage limit. 1979 N.J. Laws c. 318.
83. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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amount. 86 There are, however, several notable differences among
the state parental responsibility statutes.
B.

DifterencesAmong the Statutes

One major difference among the various parental responsibility statutes is the wide disparity in the amount of recoverable
damages.87 While some states limit recovery to nominal
amounts, 88 a few states set no recovery limit.89 The wide range of
damage limits probably reflects the differing objectives of the various state legislatures.
Another variation among states is the effect of recovery under
a parental responsibility statute on a common law action. 0 The
states take different approaches. 91 One commentator observes
that a parental responsibility statute which fails specifically to preserve common law remedies may produce the objectionable result
of limiting recovery to an amount less than would have been obtained had there been no statute. 92 Such an effect clearly contradicts the general tort law goal of compensation of the victim. 93
III.

PURPOSES OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY STATUTES

The purposes behind parental responsibility statutes have been
examined in three different forums. First, commentators objec94
tively analyze the statutes to determine what purpose they serve.
Second, legislatures occasionally articulate the goals of the parental responsibility statutes during debate on their passage. 95 Finally, courts interpret the statutes to decipher their purposes.9 6
86. See supra notes 55-83 and accompanying text.
87. A tort victim in Texas for instance, can recover up to $15,000 for any child's "wilful and malicious" conduct resulting in personal injury or property damage. Tax. FAM.
CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 33.01-.03 (Vernon Supp. 1981). The Virginia parental responsibility
statute, however, only permits a maximum recovery of $200. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-43 to -44

(1977).
88. See, e.g., VA. CODE §§ 8.01-43 to -44 (1977).
89. See supra note 55.
90. See supra notes 1-10 & 71-78 and accompanying text.
91. Twenty-one parental responsibility statutes specifically state that the statute does
not preclude the additional use of common law remedies. Twenty-eight statutes have no
such statement.
92. Note, supra note 42, at 1044.
93. Id.
94. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
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A. PurposesEnunciatedby Commentators
Scholarly analysis has enumerated four main purposes behind
parental responsibility statutes. Many commentators note that
97
such statutes were passed to compensate the tort victim. Compensation may be a partial goal, but it is probably not the primary
aim of parental responsibility statutes, since full compensation
cannot be obtained when recoverable damages are limited.
Stemming the tide of child vandalism is another goal identified
by commentators.98 The rise in child vandalism creates a desire to
hold parents more responsible for their children's actions. 99 This
goal is probably the prime force behind those parental responsibility statutes that impose liability only for property damage committed by the child."°
A third objective of the parental responsibility statutes identified in the commentary is to prevent personal injury. 10 ' Parental
responsibility statutes are seen as a mechanism to impose an obligation upon parents to control their minor children and prevent
them from intentionally harming others. 10 2 The commentators
perceive a statutory duty requiring parents to exercise more control over their children.' 0 3 This tendency to imply a duty probably results from the reluctance of the common law to impose a
duty of control on the parent unless the child is known to have
dangerous propensities. 10 4
Finally, commentators logically deduce that parental responsibility statutes are designed to overcome the difficulty of obtaining
relief from the common law remedies.10 5 Exclusively statutory relief, however, may not adequately compensate the tort victim.
The goal of improving on common law remedies should not obfor concurrent use of both common law and statuscure the need
06
1
relief.
tory
97. Note, supra note 42, at 1044; cf. Kent, supra note 2, at 452-53 (purpose of parental
responsibility statutes not purely compensatory, although the steady increase in the damage
limits tends to suggest otherwise).
98. 44 ALB. L. REV. 943, 952 (1980).
99. Note, supra note 42, at 1037.
100. Of course, the mere fact that a limit is placed on parental liability contradicts the
general aim of the shock reduction loss spreading rationale. See generally supra notes 27-

37 and accompanying text.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See, eg., Comment, supra note 51, at 762.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
44 ALB. L. REa. 943, 947 (1980); See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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The statutory purposes identified by commentators, therefore,
consist of: 1)compensating tort victims;107 2) controlling child vandalism;' 0 8 3) preventing personal injury;"0 9 and 4) providing relief

beyond common law remedies.

10

The second major source of pronouncements on the purposes

underlying parental responsibility statutes is legislative intent.
B.

PurposesDerivedfrom Legislative Intent

Legislative histories on state parental responsibility statutes
are relatively scarce. Those which do exist, however, reveal a wide
diversity of legislatively contemplated aims. Some indicate a simple desire to make parents more responsible for the actions of
their children."'I Such general statements, however, do little to aid

proper interpretation of the statute.
Legislatures often expressly state that compensation is not the
primary purpose of the parental responsibility statute. The Geor-

gia statute, for example, states that its purpose is "to provide for
the public welfare and aid in the control of juvenile delinquency,

not to provide restorative compensation to victims of injurious or
tortious conduct by children:"" 2 The Mississippi parental responsibility statute provides that the purpose of the act is to "authorize
recovery from parents in situations where they are not otherwise
liable andto limit the amount of reco very."11 And debate indicates
the Nevada statute" 4 was designed to hold parents liable for their
115
minors' willful misconduct, while limiting that liability.

Finally, some legislatures identify multiple purposes for their
parental responsibility statutes. 16 While state lawmakers often
107. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
111. Letter from JoAnn M. Hedrick, Secretary to the Chief Clerk, Delaware House of
Representatives, to Michael Axel (September 3, 1981); see Illinois General Assembly Debates, June 20, 1979, at 38 (remarks of Rep. Vinson).
112. Parental Liability for Minor Children's Torts Act - Provisions Changed, Etc.,
No. 977, 1976 Ga. Laws 511 (emphasis added).
113. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-2(3) (Supp. 1981).
114. NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.470 (1979).
115. See Nevada Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Mintues of Meeting, 54th Sess.,
February 22, 1967, at 112 (remarks of Sen. Swobe).
116. For example, the purpose of the New York parental responsibility act, N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 3-112 (McKinney Supp. 1981), has been variously described by the legislature to be to decrease vandalism against public property, to create a meaningful recourse
for injured parties, to compel parents to supervise their children more closely and develop
the child's respect for the property of others, see New York Legislative Annual (1977), at
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disagree on a single purpose, many agree that compensation is not
to be considered a primary goal.
Legislative history, therefore, also identifies various purposes behind parental responsibility statutes. As has been indicated, these
stated purposes can be either general, highly specific, or multifaceted. Although there is a dearth of state legislative history,
used by courts to dewhen such information is available it is also
7
termine the intended statutory purpose."1
C. PurposesDerivedfrom JudicialDecisions
Courts usually examine the views of commentators and legislatures when defining the purpose of a parental responsibility statute.11 ' Judicial opinions, therefore, are typically the most
exhaustive source of commentary on the relevant purposes.
Many courts, like the commentators, perceive a goal of parental responsibility statutes as inhibition of juvenile delinquency.' 19
The goal of imposing an obligation on parents to control their
children to prevent them from intentionally harming others is
often enunciated as a related objective.' 20 Judges also see the statutes as penalizing parents for the torts of their minor children.' 2 '
By viewing parental responsibility statutes as penal in nature,
courts may be trying to establish a standard of care for parents to
follow. This result, however, is not at all clear from the opinions.
Finally, unlike legislative history, judicial opinions often ascribe a
compensatory purpose to parental responsibilty statutes.' 22 This
178-79; New York Legislative Annual (1979), at 107, and to deter the malicious destruction
of property. See Transcripts of Minutes of a Public Hearing of the Sub-Committee of the
Senate Standing Committee on Codes, December 18, 1968 (remarks of Judge Raymond R.
Niemer).
117. For an example of a court considering legislative history to determine the purpose
behind a parental responsibility statute, see Buie v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W.2d 673, 675-76
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980). See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Buie v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W.2d 673 (rex. Civ. App. 1980).
119. Watson v. Gradzik, 34 Conn. Supp. 7, 10, 373 A.2d 191, 193 (1977); General Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 323, 130 S.E.2d 645, 650 (1963); see Motorists Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Bill, 56 Ohio St. 2d 258, 263, 383 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1978); Rudnay v. Corbett, 53
Ohio App. 2d 311, 315, 374 N.E.2d 171, 174 (1977).
120. See, e.g., Lutteman v. Martin, 20 Conn. Supp. 371, 373, 135 A.2d 600, 602 (C.P.
1957); Town of Groton v. Medberry, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 671, 673, 301 A.2d 270, 272 (1972);
Repko v. Seriani, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 374, 377, 214 A.2d 843, 845 (1965); Gillespie v. Gallant,
1 Conn. Cir. Ct. 594, 597, 190 A.2d 607, 608 (1963); Vanthournout v. Burge, 69 Il. App. 3d
193, 196, 387 N.E.2d 341, 343 (1979); see Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bill, 56 Ohio St. 2d 258,
263, 383 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1978).
121. See, ag., Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bill, 56 Ohio St. 2d 258, 263, 383 N.E.2d 880,
883 (1978).
122. See, eg., Watson v. Gradzik, 34 Conn. Supp. 7,10, 373 A.2d 191, 193 (1977);
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objective is readily discernible in those statutes which do not limit
the amount of recoverable damages.123 Even in those states which

limit recoverable damages, courts imply a compensatory goal into
parental responsibility statutes. These courts may be more willing
to view the statute's goal as compensatory when faced with a suffering tort victim and a relatively low damage limit. 2 4
D.

The Purposesand the Rationales

The general purpose of imposing responsibility on parents to
control their children accords with both basic vicarious liability
rationales. The primary objective of least cost prevention 12 is to
induce the least cost preventor to modify its behavior and take
precautionary measures. This parental behavior modification is
facilitated by imposing a statutory duty on parents to control their
children. Shock reduction loss spreading 126 is also enhanced by
imposing a statutory duty of parental control. Imposition of such
that the parents are best equipped to
a duty is a legal 2recognition
7
spread the lOSS.1
App. 3d 193,
Rathburn v. Kaio, 23 Hawaii 541, 544 (1916); Vanthournout v. Burge, 69 Ill.
196, 387 N.E.2d 341, 343 (1979); Buie v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980); see Izzo v. Gratton, 86 Misc. 2d 233, 235, 383 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (Cohoes City Ct.
1976). Contra Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 749-50, 182 S.E.2d 766, 769 (1971) (limits on
recovery do not serve a compensatory goal); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C.
317, 323, 130 S.E.2d 645, 650 (1963) (recovery limits do not aid compensation).
123. E.g., HAWAII REV.STAT. § 577-3 (1976); see Rathburn v. Kaio, 23 Hawaii 541, 544
(1916).
124. It may be important that the legislature and judiciary often articulate different
purposes underlying parental responsibility statutes. For example, the legislative intent behind the Georgia statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 105-113 (Supp. 1981), is to provide for the
public welfare and to control juvenile delinquency. Parental Liability for Minor Children's
Torts Act-Provisions Changed, Etc., No. 977, 1977 Ga. Laws 511. Before the Georgia
statute limited recovery, the Georgia Supreme Court also included compensation of the
tort victim as a goal. See Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 749, 182 S.E.2d 766, 770 (1971).
Similarly, the Illinois General Assembly implied that the purpose behind Parental Respon51-57 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981), was to "impose
sibilty Law, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70,
legal responsibility on the parents to try to force them to make kids behave," Illinois General Assembly Debates, June 20, 1979, at 38 (Remarks of Rep. Vinson). Just four months
earlier the Appellate Court of Illinois added compensating the injured party as an additional aim. See Vanthournout v. Burge, 69 Ill. App. 3d 193, 196, 387 N.E.2d 341, 343
(1979). Without an explicitly stated legislative purpose in the statute itself, judicial interpretations may impose different duties and obligations on parents than those which were
intended by the legislature.
125. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
127. In an elementary sense, the parents are ultimately responsible for the existence of
their child. In cold, economic terms, parents presumably have considered future tortious
behavior by their children as part of their preconception "cost-benefit analysis." This justification may, however, extend legal analysis beyond its useful limits.
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The compensatory goal also comports with economic rationales. Knowing they must compensate victims of their child's
torts will induce parents to modify their behavior and take precautionary action. Similarly, a compensatory goal aids loss
spreading. Insurance is the primary means by which tort victims
are compensated128 and parents can obtain insurance more readily
than can their children. Thus, in terms of the economic rationales
for parental responsibility statutes, the best supported statutory
purposes are imposing a parental duty to control their children
and compensating tort victims.
IV.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS

Judicial explanation of the express wording of parental responsibility statutes can affect the substantive rights of the parties
and frustrate the statutory goals.' 2 9 It is not uncommon to find
courts in different states interpreting similar provisions in parental
responsibility statutes differently. This in turn establishes
nonuniform burdens of pleading and proof.
A. JudicialInterpretationof the "'Maliciousand Willful"
Requirements
Most parental responsibility statutes limit recovery to instances
where the child's tort was performed "maliciously" or "willfully.' 30 Two divergent interpretations have been adopted in the
application of this standard. Some courts hold that plaintiffs need
not show that the defendant's child possessed a willful or malicious intent to injure or damage. In Potomac Insurance Co. v.
Torres,' for example, defendant's minor son stole a car and was
pursued by the police." 2 During the ensuing high speed chase,
the minor drove the car into a car owned by plaintiffs insured,
damaging it. 133 The New Mexico Supreme Court saw very little
difference between "willful" and "malicious" conduct. 34 Both
128. For a discussion of insurance, see infra notes 172-206 and accompanying text.
129. See Note, supra note 42, at 1044-45.

130. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.24 (West Supp. 1981) ("maliciously" or "willfully"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 217 (1981) ("willfully or maliciously"); N.D. CENT.

CODE § 32-03-39 (1976) ("maliciously" or willfully");
Supp. 1981) ("willful, malicious or wanton").
131.
132.
133.
134.

75 N.M. 129, 401 P.2d 308 (1965).
Id. at 130, 401 P.2d at 308.
Id.
Id. at 131-32, 401 P.2d at 309.

f Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.035 (West
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words were interpreted to mean "the intentioned doing of a harmful act without just cause or. .. in utter disregard for the consequences."13 5 The court reasoned that since the minor's intentional
acts were done without just cause and with utter disregard for
their consequences, the requisite statutory malice or willfulness
was present, and defendant was held liable.136 Thus, under
Torres, only the child's initial act, and not the subsequent injury
or damage need be performed willfully or maliciously for liability
to attach under the parental responsibility statute.
Another line of decisions requires a stricter showing of willful
or malicious intent. In a factual setting nearly identical to that in
Torres, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Motorists Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Bill,137 rejected the Torres standard and interpreted "willfully damages property" under the Ohio parental
responsibility
13 9
statute 138 to require a dual showing of intent.
Under the Ohio rule both the initial act, as well as the subsequent damage, must be performed intentionally.140 This is opposed to the Torres rule which only requires the initial act to be
intentionally performed for parental liability to attach. 14 1 As the
court aptly observed, "the intentional doing of an act does not
necessarily make the unintentional damage it produces, willful or
intentional." 142 Under the "dual intent" rule, a mere showing of a
child's intentional act, absent an actual intent to injure or damage,
will not impose liability under a parental responsibility tort statute. 143 Application of the dual intent standard in Bill resulted in a
finding of no parental liability.'"
A similar interpretation of the "willful or malicious" requirement was made in Crum v. Groce. 145 Defendant's minor son,
against his mother's wishes and without a license, used a motorcy135. Id.
136. Id. at 132, 401 P.2d at 309. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-46 (1981).
137. 56 Ohio St. 2d 258, 383 N.E.2d 880 (1978).
138. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.09, 3109.10 (Page 1980).
139. 56 Ohio St. 2d at 266, 383 N.E.2d at 884.
140. Id.
141. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
142. 56 Ohio St. 2d at 266, 383 N.E.2d at 884.
143. The dual intent rule was succinctly described in Town of Groton v. Medberry, 6
Conn. Cir. Ct. 671, 673, 301 A.2d 270, 272 (1972): "Not only the action producing the
injury but the resulting injury must be intentional." (quoting Rogers v. Doody, 119 Conn.
532, 534, 178 A. 51, 52 (1935)).
144. 56 Ohio St. 2d at 266, 383 N.E.2d at 885.
145. 192 Colo. 185, 556 P.2d 1223 (1976).
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cle to complete an errand.14 6 The child ran through a stop sign,
colliding with and damaging plaintiff's van. 14 7 Determining that

the child was, at most, negligent in failing to heed the stop sign,
the court reasoned that he could not have intended to willfully
damage plaintiff's vehicle. 148 Accordingly, defendant could not 149
be
held liable under the Colorado parental responsibility statute.
The dual intent interpretation of the "willful or malicious" requirement is the more preferable standard. Although loss spreading is not really affected by how the parental liability is incurred,
least cost prevention strongly favors the dual intent rule. Least
cost preventing parents will find it much easier to take precautionary action against intentional injury or damage, as opposed to
only an intentional act with resulting but unforeseen damage or
injury. Parents can warn the child against engaging in any intentional injury or damage, or constrict the child's liability producing
behavior altogether in light of the likelihood that the child will
engage in such intentional acts. The dual intent requirement is a
recognition of the inability of parents to fully control their children's acts.150 Since parents, however, cannot effectively prevent
unknown and unknowable
results-negligent outcomes-imposing vicarious liability in such situations would not
be justifiable in terms of least cost prevention.
B. JudicialInterpretationof the "DamagingPropery"
Requirement
Courts give both narrow and broad interpretations to the statutory requirement that property be "damaged." Courts following
the narrow approach often require actual damage to or destruction of the property before parental liability will be imposed. In
Lamb v. Randall,15 ' defendant's son burglarized plaintiff's home,
taking jewelry and coins, which were eventually pawned for
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
"willful

Id. at 186, 556 P.2d at 1223-24.
Id.
Id. at 187, 556 P.2d at 1224.
Id.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text. One additional interpretation of the
and malicious" requirement of parental responsibility statutes is not unique to

these statutes, but is inherent within any statutory use of the terms. Courts sometimes
construe "willful" and "malicious" so as to exclude parental liability because the minor's
age precludes a finding of willfulness or malice. See, e.g., Connors v. Pantano, 165 Neb.
515, 86 N.W.2d 367 (1957) (holding six year old legally incapable of willfully and inten-

tionally destroying property within the provision of the Nebraska statute).
151. 95 N.M. 35, 618 P.2d 379 (1980).
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53
money.1 52 The New Mexico parental responsibility statute1

makes parents liable if their minor child damages or destroys
property. The New Mexico Supreme Court, however, refused to
impose parental liability,'54 holding that since the stolen property
was pawned, and not physically damaged or destroyed, defendants could not be held liable.' 55
Other courts have viewed the term "damage" more expansively. The Ohio parental responsibility statute 56 permits recovery if the child "willfully damages property." 57 In Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Davis, 5 1 this statutory wording was construed to
include theft of property. The court reasoned that it makes little
dedifference to the tort victim whether property is stolen or
59
stroyed; the victim is deprived of the property either way.'
The least cost prevention rationale might favor the narrow
construction of "damage." Although the parent remains the least
cost preventor in the transaction, 6 ' it may arguably be easier for
parents to take precautions against their child's damage or destruction of property than against outright theft, since child vandalism or property damage may be more foreseeable than theft.
Shock reduction loss spreading, however, is enhanced by a broad
construction of "damage" which includes theft. As the definition
of liability producing behavior is expanded, parental loss spreading activities can direct more liability from the child to other individuals better able to bear the costs. Including theft or use
deprivation of property within the definition of "damage" is,
therefore, explicable under this rationale.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 36-37, 618 P.2d at 380-81.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-46 (1981).
95 N.M. at 37, 618 P.2d at 381.
Id. The dissent in Lamb criticized the majority's ultra-strict construction:

If property "belonging" to a person is stolen from that person, the person has
" To hold
suffered a "loss," [and] his property is "damaged or destroyed ..
otherwise is to restrict the scope of recovery and hinder accomplishment of the
statute's compensatory goal, thereby limiting parental duty and encouraging children to engage in the "theft" of property.
Id. at 38, 618 P.2d at 382 (Andrews, J., dissenting). Less than a year after Lamb was
decided, perhaps in response to Judge Andrews' dissent, the New Mexico Legislature
amended the state parental responsibility statute to impose parental liability if the minor
"deprive[s the] use of property . . . belonging to the person bringing the action." 1981
N.M. Laws ch. 36, § 33. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-46 (1981).
156. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.09 (Page 1980).
157. Id.

158. 52 Ohio Misc. 26 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1977).
159. Id. at 29.
160. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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C. JudicialInterpretationof "Property"
Further problems arise when personal injury claims are
brought under parental responsibility statutes which, by their
wording, limit recovery to property damage. Such wording gives
rise to a negative implication that personal injury actions were
meant to be excluded. Thus, "property" has been narrowly construed to deny recovery in such cases. To circumvent this problem
the resourceful plaintiff in Ross v. Souter 16 1 sued to recover for
damage to his son's teeth which were damaged in a fight with defendant's son. 16 2 The New Mexico statute, while permitting recovery for damage to property, "real, personal, or mixed,
belonging to such . . .person,"' 163 did not expressly cover personal injury. The plaintiff reasoned that his substantial investment in his son's orthodontia constituted a property interest under
the statute. 64 The court rejected this argument, stating:
[We see] no logical reason . .. which would justify holding
that either the teeth or the investment in orthodontic work
should properly be considered as property of the parent, and
destruction of which, recovery might be had
for the damage or165
under the statute.
Such cases demonstrate the need for clearly enunciated forms of
relief in parental responsibility statutes.
The widely divergent judicial interpretations of statutory requirements affect the substantive rights of the parties. The dual
intent rule 66 requiring a showing that both the initial tortious act
as well as the subsequent injury or damage were committed intentionally conflicts directly with the looser standard 6 7 whereby intentional injury or damage need not be shown.168 Furthermore,
two basic definitions of "property damage" have evolved. Under
one, 169 actual physical damage is required before recovery is al161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

81 N.M. 181, 464 P.2d 911 (1970).
Id. at 182, 464 P.2d at 912.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-46 (1981).
81 N.M. at 182-83, 464 P.2d at 912-13.
Id. at 183, 464 P.2d at 913.

166. See supra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
168. Comfpare Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bill, 56 Ohio St. 2d 258, 383 N.E.2d 880 (1978)
(no parental liability where both the initial act and the subsequent damage were not intentional) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3109.09 (Page 1980) with Potomoc Ins. Co. v. Torres,
75 N.M. 129, 401 P.2d 308 (1965) (parental liability appropriate since requisite malice or
willfullness could be found in minor's intentional initial act from which damages flowed)
and N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 32-1-46 (1981).
169. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
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lowed. According to the better position, 70 however, theft or deprivation of the use of property will suffice to impose parental
liability. 7 ' Finally, some statutes are ambiguously drafted so that
it is unclear whether personal injury claims are actionable under
-the statute. The inconsistency among judicial interpretations of
the statutory requirements further emphasizes the need for uniform legislation.
V.

INSURANCE RELIEF UNDER PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
STATUTES

Two basic questions are raised by the introduction of insurance 1rotection in cases arising under parental responsibility statutes. First, whether an insurer must provide coverage to an
insured for statutorily imposed parental liability; and second,
whether the subrogated insurer of a minor tortfeasor's victim may
bring an action in its own name against the parent under the parental responsibility statute.
A.

The Rights of InsuredParents

The right of parents to coverage for any liability incurred
under a parental responsibility statute depends on the interpretation of the various policy provisions. Insurance policies are often
liberally construed to include coverage for parents who are sued
under parental responsibility statutes. In Walker v. Lumbermens
Mutual Casualty Co. ,72 the plaintiff-parent previously had been
sued under a parental responsibility statute and was forced to defend himself when the defendant-insurer refused coverage. 173 The
plaintiff lost, and brought a subsequent action against the defendant on the insurance contract for the amount of the judgment and
attorneys' fees. 174 The policy defined the term "insured" as including all members of the family; the court concluded the definition
170. See supra notes 156-72 and accompanying text.
171. Compare Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 52 Ohio Misc. 26 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1977)
(parental liability imposed because "damages" includes theft) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.09 (Page 1980) with Lamb v. Randall, 95 N.M. 35, 618 P.2d 379 (1980) (no parental
liability because the property, not having been physically damaged, had not been "damaged" or "destroyed" within the meaning of the statute) and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-46
(1981).
172. 491 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
173. Id. at 697.
174. Id. Coverage "D" of plaintiffs policy provided for damages the insured became
legally obligated to pay. Id. Damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of the
insured was excluded. Id.
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was intended to broaden the coverage of the policy. 1 75 Construing
plaintiff was entitled to
the term expansively, the court held the
176
coverage under the insurance contract.
Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fire Insurance
Co.1 77 provides another example of interpreting insurance policies

liberally to provide coverage for parents who have incurred statutorily imposed parental liability. Insured's son stole a car belonging to the plaintiffs insured and recklessly damaged it.'7 8 After
settling its insured's damage claim, the plaintiff-insurer obtained a

17 9
judgment under the Michigan parental responsibility statute

against defendant's-insured. 8 0 The plaintiff-insurer then brought

a garnishment action against the defendant-the parents' insurer.'18 To decide whether coverage for statutory parental liability was provided, the court construed the policy terms' 8 2 by
applying well-known rules of construction:
If the question is whether the policy be broad enough to cover
an asserted liability the terms are liberally construed to favor
coverage. If the question is whether the exclusionary provisions of a policy avoid the asserted liability, the exclusionary
183
language is strictly construed, again to favor insurance.

Although coverage for automobile accidents occurring while

the car was away from home was excluded,' 8 4 the court required
the defendant-insurer to provide coverage since the parental re-

sponsibility statute imposed liability "independent of the means
the child employed to cause the destruction."'8

5

In contrast with Walker and Shelby, courts construing policy
provisions strictly will deny coverage for statutorily imposed parental liability. In Randolph v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co. ,186 a
plaintiff-parent was held liable under the Ohio parental responsi175. Id. at 699.
176. Id.
177. 12 Mich. App. 145, 162 N.W.2d 676 (1968).
178. Id. at 148, 162 N.W.2d at 677-78.
179. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2913 (Supp. 1981).
180. 12 Mich. App. at 148.
181. Id.
182. The policy protected the parents for all damages they became legally obligated to
pay. Id. at 147, 162 N.W.2d at 677. Automobile accidents, however, were excluded from
coverage if the car was used while away from home. Id. at 147-48, 162 N.W.2d at 677.
Each family member was covered. Id. at 148, 162 N.W.2d at 677.
183. Id. at 149, 162 N.W.2d at 678.
184. See supra note 181.

185. 12 Mich. App. at 150, 162 N.W.2d at 678.
186. 57 Ohio St. 2d 25, 385 N.E.2d 1305 (1979).
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bility statute i" 7 for his minor son's intentional tort causing $2,000
in property damage.188 The defendant-insurer agreed to pay only
$250 via a supplemental coverage provision which obligated the
defendant-insurer to pay for all "damage. . . caused by" an accident.'8 9 Plaintiff sued to collect the remaining $1,750,190 arguing
that since his son's act was unexpected it was an accident and
therefore defendant must pay the entire $2,000 statutory liability. 9 ' The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the denial of coverage,
noting:
From the fact that liabilty may have been unexpected or "accidental" to appellant; it does not follow that the damage was
unexpected or accidentally caused. Indeed, appellant concedes
that the damage was not the product of an192accident but of [his
son's] willful and intentional misconduct.
Broad construction of insurance policies in cases involving liability under parental responsibility statutes is the preferred position. Both economic rationales justifying these statutes support a
broad construction. Liability insurance is one of the major preaccident precautions under least cost prevention. If parents know
their insurance policies will be narrowly construed, added cost in
obtaining coverage for statutory parental liability may preclude
procurement of adequate insurance protection. Loss spreading,
typically done through the use of insurance, will be encouraged by
broad construction of insurance policies.
B.

The Rights of Insurance Company-Subrogees

A controversial issue in this area of the law is whether a tort
victim's subrogated insurance company has any direct recourse
under the parental responsibility statutes. Several courts have
held that a subrogated insurer of the tort victim may sue the
tortfeasor's parent under a parental responsibility statute. 93 In
GeneralInsurance Co. of 4merica v. Faulkner,9 4 for example, the
plaintiff-insurer became subrogated to the rights of its insured, the
187. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.09 (Page 1980).

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

57 Ohio St. 2d at 25-26, 385 N.E.2d at 1305.
Id., 385 N.E.2d at 1306.
Id., 385 N.E.2d at 1305.
Id. at 27, 385 N.E.2d at 1306.
Id., 385 N.E.2d at 1306 (emphasis supplied). For a discussion of the dual intent

rule, see supra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 325, 130 S.E.2d 645,
651 (1963); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bill, 56 Ohio St. 2d 258, 267, 383 N.E.2d 880, 885
(1978); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 52 Ohio Misc. 26, 27 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1977).
194. 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963).
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local board of education, upon paying the insured for fire damage
caused by the malicious and willful conduct of the defendant's
son. 1 95 The plaintiff-insurer sued under the North Carolina statute 196 to recover the statutory limit of $500.197 The defendant's
demurrer alleged that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue under
the statute and was not the real party in interest.1 98 The court initially observed that if the board of education had not held liability
insurance it certainly would have been able to sue under the parental responsibility statute.1 99 The court refused to deny the
plaintiff-insurer standing simply because the right was obtained
through subrogation.2° The court further noted that denial of the
subrogated claim,
[w]ould lead to the illogical result that the defendants admittedly liable... to the... Board of Education in an amount
not exceeding $500.00, if it had no insurance, are relieved of all
liability by reason of the collection of insurance by the ...
Board of Education; in other words, the defendants would rebenefit of the insurance without having to pay a cent
ceive the
20 1
for it.
The insurer-subrogee's right to maintain an action against the
minor tortfeasor's parents was further discussed in Motorists MutualInsurance Co. v. Bill.2 "2 To prevent what would be "a most
inequitable determination, ' 20 3 the Ohio Supreme Court held that
a subrogated insurer could maintain an action under the Ohio
statute,2 °4 observing that the "foresighted insured who has provided insurance coverage for his own damages . . . should not
provide an escape hatch for parents who would have otherwise
to the owner for the damaging acts of their
been held accountable
'2 5
minor children.
On first consideration, allowing subrogees to sue statutorily li195. Id. at 318-19, 130 S.E.2d at 647.
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (1969).

197. 259 N.C. at 319, 130 S.E.2d at 647.
198. Id. The North Carolina statute permits recovery by "[a]ny person, firm, corporation, the State of North Carolina or any political subdivision thereof, or any religious,
educational or charitable organization, or any nonprofit cemetary corporation, or organizaN.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (1969).
tion, whether incorporated or unincorporated.
199. 259 N.C. at 325, 130 S.E.2d at 651-52.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 326, 130 S.E.2d at 652.
202. 56 Ohio St. 2d 258, 383 N.E.2d 880 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes
137-44 for a further discussion of Bill.
203. Id. at 268, 383 N.E.2d at 886.
204. Id. at 266-67, 383 N.E.2d at 885.
205. Id. at 267, 383 N.E.2d at 885.
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able parents seems to provide a windfall to insurance companies
whose job, after all, is to provide insurance coverage for a fee. The
economic rationales, however, again illustrate the logic of the rule.
In least cost prevention terms, the threat of suits by insurer-subrogees will provide a forceful prod to induce parents of potential
minor tortfeasors to take preventive measures. Furthermore, in
terms of shock reduction loss spreading, such insurer-subrogee actions merely represent another cost of obtaining insurance 206-the
fundamental loss spreading function.

VI.

RECAPITULATION

Although common law remedies exist for torts committed by
minors, these nonstatutory actions contain inherent pleading and
evidentiary obstacles for plaintiffs. 2°7 These deficiencies led to the
adoption of state parental responsibility statutes-vicarious liability acts justified by the basic economic rationales of least cost prevention and shock reduction loss spreading. The widely disparate
legislative and judicial interpretations of the statutes, however,
have produced an array of differing rights and duties.20 8 A potential litigant, therefore, must analyze the relevant parental responsibilty statute and-correlative case law to find answers to several
basic questions. First, who may be sued under the statute? Most
parental responsibility statutes only hold "parents" liable-guardians or foster parents may not be covered. 20 9 Furthermore, may separate suits be brought against each parent, or does
the notion of a "parental unit" 2 1° preclude dual actions? 2 1' A second major question is what constitutes "willful and malicious" behavior? In some states only an intentional initial act need be
shown; others require an additional showing that the actual damage resulting from the initial act be intentionally inflicted.21 2
Third, what qualifies as "damage" to property? Some courts hold
that physical damage or destruction is required, while others in206. Parental responsibility statutes have been found to increase insurance costs to consumers. See Nevada Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Minutes of Meeting, 58th Sess.,
May 7, 1975, at 273 (remarks of George L. Ciapusci, State Farm Insurance Co.).
207. See supra notes 240 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 128-60 and accompanying text.
209. See generally Windish v. Watts, 9 Pa. D. & C.3d 234 (C.P. Bucks County 1979)
(discussing who may be sued and how much may be recovered).
210. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 209.
212. See supra notes 131-50 and accompanying text.
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elude theft within the "damage" definition. 13 Finally, a litigant
must determine the proper purpose behind the parental responsibility statute--compensation, control of child vandalism, provision of relief beyond the common law remedies, or another as yet
unarticulated purpose-and how this aim can best be served in
light of the other competing statutory goals.2 14 By delineating the
proper purpose for parental responsibility statutes, the litigant can
construct a case which both furthers the statutory goals and adds
to the substantive body of tort law as well.
VII.

MODEL PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT

In an attempt to provide concrete answers to the questions that
have been raised, this Note concludes with a presentation of a
Model Parental Responsibility Act.
A. Model ParentalResponsibility Act
Sec. 1. The parent or parents, or guardian or guardians, of a
minor child may be held liable for:
a) personal injury to another inflicted nonnegligently
by the minor child; and/or
b) damage to, or deprivation of the use of, property
belonging to another, committed nonnegligently by
the minor child.
Sec. 2. Damages are recoverable as follows:
a) damages up to two thousand five hundred dollars
($2,500) inclusive are recoverable in full;
b) damages exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) are recoverable to the extent of onehalf of such damages actually suffered;
c) only one recovery per pair of parents or guardians
may be obtained;
d) payment of costs and attorneys' fees may be
awarded in addition to damages if judgment shall
be rendered against a party litigant and, in the
opinion of the court, such award is merited.
Sec. 3. Statutory liability is additional to, and does not preclude, any common law liability of the parent(s),
guardian(s), and/or minor child.
Sec. 4. The purpose of this Act is to:
a) partially compensate tort victims; and
b) impose upon parents and/or guardians the responsibility to control their children's acts.
213. See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 94-127 and accompanying text.
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B. Improvements Offered by the Mode/1Act
One difficulty encountered with many parental responsibility
statutes is determining who may be sued.2 15 Statutes often are
worded in terms of "parents" 2 16 and do not specifically authorize
an action against guardians. The Model Act removes this ambiguity by using "parent or parents, or guardian or guardians" in
section 1. Furthermore, section 2(c) limits the potential judgment
to "[o]nly one recovery . . . per pair of parents or guardians
Another major problem with existing parental responsibility
statutes is determining what constitutes "willful or malicious" behavior by the minor. Contained within this issue is the question
of whether an actual intent to damage or injure on the part of the
child must be shown, or whether proof of an intentional initial act
is sufficient to establish parental vicarious liability.2 17 The Model
Act addresses these problems in two ways. First, the "nonnegligently" standard in sections l(a) and (b) avoids confusion over
what entails "malicious" or "willful" conduct; any injury producing behavior that cannot be classified as "negligent" may result in
parental liability.2 18 Second, the use of the phrases "inflicted nonnegligently" and "committed nonnegligently" in sections l(a) and
(b) emphasize that the actual injury or damage must be performed
nonnegligently.2 1 9 The mere showing of a nonnegligent initial act
will not suffice to impose parental liability.
A further ambiguity in existing statutes is the use of the language "damage to property." The Model Act imposes parental
liability for the child's nonnegligent "damage to, or deprivation of
the use of, property." This definition is broad enough to include
property damage, burglary, and larceny. 2 0
The purpose of the Model Act is explicitly stated in section 4.
This ensures that courts cannot overemphasize, underemphasize,
215. See supra note 209.
216. Eg., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2913 (Supp. 1981).
217. See supra notes 130-50 and accompanying text.

218. It is intended that "nonnegligently" would include all reckless, knowing, and purposeful behavior.
219. See generally Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bill, 56 Ohio St. 2d 258, 383 N.E.2d 880
(1978) (requiring both the subsequent damage and the initial act to have been done

intentionally).
220. See generally Lamb v. Randall, 95 N.M. 35, 618 P.2d 379 (1980) (theft of property
held excluded from coverage of parental responsibility statute covering damage to or destruction of property). For a general discussion ofLamb, see text accompanying notes 15155 supra.
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or ignore the avowed aims of the Act. 2
The purposes of the Model Act are clearly implemented by
section 2's treatment of recoverable damages. The Model Act's
damage provisions represent a compromise between ideals and reality. While compensating tort victims is a strong motivating factor behind many parental responsibility statutes, 2 2 2 parents cannot
always be expected to control their children's acts completely.
The Model Act, therefore, limits recovery to one-half the actual
damages suffered for all damage amount in excess of $2,500. This
recovery limitation is an improvement on the prevailing practice
of limiting recoverable damages to a certain maximum dollar
amount. With the present average statutory recovery limit being
approximately $2500,223 few victims can be adequately compensated. Under the Model Act, tort victims will receive more compensation than if recovery were limited to a maximum dollar
amount. Moreover, damages less than $2,500 are recoverable in
full. In addition, the knowledge that they are liable in full for
damages up to and including $2,500, and for one-half of any damage claim in excess of $2,500 will induce parents to exercise more
control over their minor children.2 2 4 A final advantage of the
damage recovery proposal is its encouragement of the full use of
attorneys. Instead of much of the statutorily limited damages being consumed by legal fees, the proposed system allows the use of
contingency fee arrangements, thereby guaranteeing that the tort
victim recovers a fair portion of the damages. Section 2(d),
finally, provides for the specific award of attorneys' fees if the trial
judge deems such an award necessary. Such provisions should encourage individuals to seek redress, thereby further prodding parents to exercise control and obtain insurance.
Finally, many state parental responsibility statutes do not expressly permit the statutory remedy to be supplemented with concurrent common law relief.22 ' Section 3 of the Model Act ensures
that the act, being in derogation of the common law, will not be so
221. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 97 & 122-24 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 56.
224. The operation of the damage recovery proposal can be readily illustrated with a
hypothetical plaintiff who has incurred $5,000 in damages due to defendant's child's tortious behavior. After receiving a favorable judgment, plaintiff would be able to recover
$3,750-100% of the first $2,500 and 50% of all damages in excess of $2,500. If the court
believed defendant's failure to control his or her child was particularly egregious, an award
of attorneys' fees and costs would be justified.
225. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
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strictly construed as to limit all parental liability for children's
torts solely to the statutory limit. Should the victim, therefore, be
able to establish the elements of a common law claim, full recovery may be possible. 26
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The right to relief for child-inflicted tort damage is often difficult to establish under available common law actions. This difficulty inspired the passage of parental responsibility statutes.2 2 7
These statutes are justified by the economic rationales of least cost
prevention 228 and shock reduction loss spreading.2 29 The imposition of vicarious liability induces the least cost preventing parents
to take precautionary measures against their children's tortious
acts. Parental responsibility statutes also reduce the shock of the
loss occasioned by tortious activity by spreading those losses to
others through the parents' loss spreading activity.
Most parental responsibility statutes limit recovery to intentional torts only.23 ° In addition, damages are usually limited to a
certain maximum dollar amount.2 3 ' Such a limitation of damages
does not further the compensatory goal of the statutes.
Commentators, 232 legislators, 233 and judges2 34 have enunciated

the various purposes behind parental responsibility statutes. The
purposes that are most fully justified by the economic rationales
are compensation of the tort victim and the imposition of a parental duty to control children.
Interpretation of the express wording of parental responsibility
statutes affects the substantive rights of the parties. 35 These interpretive problems are especially obvious in cases involving insurance coverage under the statutes.23 6 This Note attempts to deal
with these problems by presenting a Model Parental Responsibil226. It should be noted that double recovery-under both a common law claim and a
statutory claim-is impermissable. Plaintiff will obviously be limited to a 100% common
law recovery should this be available.
227. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 172-206 and accompanying text.

STATUTORY VICARIOUS PARENTAL LIABILITY

ity Act.2 37 Adoption of provisions similar to those of the Model
Act will remove many interpretive difficulties associated with existing parental responsibility statutes. The result should be a uniformly applied system of statutory vicarious parental liability that
effectively meets the needs of the parties involved.
MICHAEL

237. See supra text accompanying notes 215-25.

A.

AXEL

